



WIRA

MEDIA INFORMASI KEMENTERIAN PERTAHANAN

STATE DEFENSE IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY TO IMPROVE THE NATION'S IDEOLOGY RESILIENCE



**THE SYNERGY OF TNI, POLICE
AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (BIN)**

**STRENGTHENING NATIONAL
HEALTH SYNERGIES THROUGH
THE ENHANCEMENT OF
KEMHAN AND TNI
HEALTH RESOURCES
PROFESSIONALISM TO SUPPORT
NATIONAL DEFENSE**


**COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION
FOR THE EXCESSIVE
NUMBER OF
FLAG OFFICER AND
COLONEL**





**MEMPERKUAT SINERGITAS KESEHATAN NASIONAL
MELALUI PENINGKATAN PROFESIONALISME SUMBER DAYA
KESEHATAN KEMHAN DAN TNI GUNA MENDUKUNG PERTAHANAN NEGARA**

Jakarta, 12 Februari 2018



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Editorial



Dear kind readers,

We warmly greet you through this second edition of WIRA in 2018.

Wira edition of March-April 2018 brings materials related to State Defense Implementation Strategy Tto Improve the Nation's Ideology Resilience; The Synergy of TNI, Police and National Intelligence Agency (BIN); Strengthening National Health Synergies Through the Enhancement of Kemhan and TNI Health Resources Professionalism to Support National Defense; Comprehensive Solution for the Excessive Number of Flag Officer and Colonel

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STATE DEFENSE IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY TO IMPROVE THE NATION’S IDEOLOGY RESILIENCE

By:

Yuli Ari Sulistyani

(Defense Diplomacy Defense University Alumni)

Background

Globalization is the process of inter-individual, inter-group, inter-state or social systems that are interconnected, and mutually influence each other across the state and geographical boundaries. The process of globalization is characterized by social, economic, and cultural relations throughout the world, borderless country boundaries (Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, 2009). In the era of globalization, there are three main things: human, goods and capital, as well as information. The development of information and communication technology is a major

supporting factor in the globalization process because information can spread rapidly throughout the world.

The 21st century is often called the century of transparency because the interaction among people in the world is more free and intensive. This condition will affect the aspect of life of the nation and the country that can affect the mindset, attitude, and the pattern of the Indonesian nation. The quick and easy globalization flux can affect people, especially the youth. The globalization process, characterized by trans local, transnational, and trans cultural, require that young people

to align themselves with the social changes that occur in the world. This will have a negative impact on Indonesian youth if they cannot filter foreign cultures that fit with the identity and the personality of the Indonesian nation. For examples, the attitudes and behaviors of everyday youth life today such as drug use, consumptive behavior, hedonism, pornography, free sex, cyber crime, individualistic and indifferent to the environment, as well as disrespectful of the elderly.

If this continues to be allowed, the morale of the younger generation of the Indonesian nation will become corrupted. The young Indonesians no

longer have a sense of nationalism because there is no love for the culture of the nation itself and no longer care about the community. In addition to the declining sense of nationalism, globalization has also affected the decline of ideology based on idealism, values, and national pride because of the influence of liberalism, materialism, and pragmatism. Globalization attempts to influence and change the mindset of the Indonesian people from Pancasila turned to liberalism that is considered to bring progress and prosperity. Thus, globalization can have an impact on the resilience of the nation's ideology as a part of national resilience. Based on data from Lemhannas, Indonesia's national resilience in 2015 is considered less resilient with a score of 2.54 (from a score of 1-5). (Anna Irhandayaningsih, 2012).

To improve the resilience of the nation, especially the resilience of ideology, then in this era of globalization Pancasila as the ideology of the nation must be implemented in everyday life to maintain the existence of the personality of the Indonesian nation. This is very important to do so that the youth of Indonesia is not carried away the flow of the negative impact of foreign culture. One effort

to foster a sense of nationalism and also to prevent the negative impact of globalization on Indonesian youth should be instilled awareness of state defending in the youth. Many lay people who think that the concept and execution of state defense is only for military / military only. However, in fact defending the state is the right and obligation of all citizens of Indonesia as regulated in the 1945 Constitution article 27 paragraph 3. State Defense aims to raise the values of love of the country, love of the nation, and Indonesian culture. Spiritual mental training in the defense of the state can counteract the influence of foreign culture that is not in accordance with the norms of life of the Indonesian nation. (Anna Irhandayaningsih, 2012).

State Defense as a Means to Increase the Resilience of Ideology

Meanwhile, in the current era of globalization, science and technology as well as information and communication science is also growing rapidly that it is able to bring us to a major change in the new world order that can penetrate through the state border. Thus, the form of threat continues to grow, initially it was only conventional (physical) threat and

then developed into multidimensional (physical and non physical) with the source of threats that vary from state and non-state actors.

The Government of Indonesia through the State Defense Program seeks to establish an effective and highly defensive state defense based on awareness of the rights and obligations of every citizen to defend the Indonesian state. Therefore, the State Defense Program is emphasized on the formation of mindset or mindset of all components of the nation, including the youth.

Indonesian youth need to have awareness of defending the state as part of the effort of mental revolution as well as to build the nation's defensive power in the face of various forms of threats that exist. For that, if analyzed by using the concept of ideological endurance, then defend the state is a means to foster a sense of nationalism and understand and practice the ideology of Pancasila in everyday life.

Minister of Defense, Ryamizard Ryacudu stated that the tip of the state defense is about loving the Indonesia state, therefore that every citizen is ready to sacrifice for the nation and state. This is because love of the homeland and the country is not just automatically arise but begins with a sense of pride as a nation of Indonesia because of understanding the history of this nation. Therefore, the essence is to instill a sense of nationalism in everyone and believe that the ideology of the Indonesian nation is Pancasila. Those can improve the resilience of the ideology of the Indonesia in order to incarnate a strong national resilience.

Understanding of State Defense among the Youths



Among the common people, including the youth, there is still misperception about the concept and the implementation of state defense. Many still think that state defenses are related to wars, arms, and the duties of either Military or the Armed forces. However, in fact every citizen is obliged to participate in the effort of State defense in accordance with what is mandated in the 1945 Constitution article 27 and 30. So, State defense can be done by every citizen of Indonesia in accordance with their respective fields and professions respectively that can be realized in various aspects of life such as ideology, politics, economy, socio-culture, and defense of security. Therefore, the understanding of state defenses needs to be straightened out and awareness of the state defending among youth needs to be improved.

State defense consists of two major dimensions, known as physical and non-physical (psychic). Physical State Defense is used to confront

the threat of war. Youth can do so through devotion such as volunteering themselves as a TNI soldiers and join a compulsory basic military training. Then, defending non-physical states is used to deal with non-military threats such as ideology, economy, politics, radical understanding, and foreign cultures that can have a negative impact on the lives and mindsets of the youth. The youth can perform non-physical state defenses through civic education, understanding and practice of Pancasila in everyday life, and dedication according to their respective professions. Devotion in accordance with each profession means that every youth plunge directly into the field to contribute to the community in accordance with the skills and abilities. For example, for a teacher who teaches students in remote, outer, and underdeveloped areas, his/her profession as a teacher provides benefits for the advancement of education in Indonesia.

It should be understood that the youth can defend the country through the small things in everyday life. Based on the conception of the Directorate General of Defense Potential of the Ministry of Defense, the elements of state defense can be implemented in daily life as follows:

- a. Love the homeland can be done by keep the soil & yard and the entire space of Indonesia, keep the environment clean, proud to be the nation of Indonesia, keep the good name of the nation and the country of Indonesia in the international world. Besides, it can also be in the form of contributing to the progress of the nation and the state of Indonesia in accordance with the profession or the expertise, become a young achievers who is able to scale the name of the nation, use the domestic products by buying and promoting it, love and preserve Indonesian culture and arts compared to foreign culture.





- b. The awareness of nation and state can be done by having an awareness that the Indonesian nation consists of various cultures, tribes, religions, languages, and customs, respecting and honoring red and white flags, national symbols and national anthem Indonesia Raya. It can be in fostering harmony to maintain unitary and unity of the smallest neighborhood or family, community environment, educational environment and work environment, not discriminate people based on religious, ethnic, racial and class (SARA). Forms of obedience and compliance with applicable laws and regulations, such as paying taxes on time.
- c. Believing in Pancasila as a state ideology can be done by understanding the values Pancasila, and implementing the value of Pancasila in everyday life. Also make Pancasila as a unifying the

- nation and state and are confident about the truth of Pancasila as the state ideology.
- d. Sacrificing can be done by putting the public interest rather than personal or group interests, willing to sacrifice the time, energy, mind/ thought, and material for the improvement of the nation, ready to defend the country from various threats, have a concern for the salvation of the nation, have spirit of patriotism, as well as helping each other.
- e. Having the initial ability of State defense means that the youth have intellectual intelligence, spiritual intelligence, emotional intelligence as well as intelligence to survive or intelligence in overcoming difficulties, always maintain the health of the soul and body, discipline, tenacious, and never give up to face the challenge, maintain

the spiritual and physical ability, has the ability to defend the country in the form of skills such as martial arts.

Implementation Strategy of State Defense

The Indonesian government is increasingly showing its serious efforts to instill the awareness of the state's defenses to the Indonesian people, including the youth. This has been done through a variety of ways through education and through the State Defence Program which began to be implemented since 2015. During this time, the implementation strategy of state defense that has been done by the Indonesian government is more focused in education matters. It has been proved by the cooperation undertaken by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of National Education and Culture through one of the subject areas of Civic Education which is given

to all students in Indonesia ranging from elementary school to higher education.

At the college level, the cultivation of state defense has been done through three basic concept of higher education called Tri Dharma Perguruan Tinggi. The first Dharma or Promise through the provision of state defense subject. The second Dharma is through the research and development of the study of state defense. The third Dharma is a community service activity as a direct contribution of the youth in the effort to build and promote Indonesia. As part of the implementation of the science of defense in the form of state behavior, the state defense education program in the university is also part of the effort to eliminate the non military threat that occurs in the region or border areas so that the human resources development (HR) can provide benefits in maintaining the sovereignty of the state.

Then, the next implementation strategy of state defense is going

through the State Defense Program. Minister of Defense Ryamizard Ryacudu stressed that the State Defense Program is not a conscription as it is thought by common people. However, the State Defense Program is a program that aims to shape the character and personality of the Indonesian nation to be able to actualize themselves and their hearts to defend the country. The State Defense Program initiated by the Ministry of Defense was started in 2015 and has involved 4,500 cadres from 45 districts / cities in Indonesia. The government's target is to launch 100 million cadres in the next 10 years. This program can be followed by all Indonesian citizens with various backgrounds and professions.

Forms of the State Defense Program

In the State Defense Program, the materials provided consist of 70-80% theories and field practice of about 20-30%. Material in the field of theory includes debriefing of national insight, leadership, state defense, proxy war, RI Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defense,

traffic order, religious harmony, and drug abuse. Fieldwork materials include marching rules, military salute rules, military martial arts, survival, game simulation, communication, instruction, tactical training and techniques such as land navigation, and outbound.

In its implementation, the State Defense Program is divided into three types of Training, among others Training in Education Sphere, Work Sphere and also Residential Environment. Among the three Training Programs each is divided into three categories such as the Training of State Defense Middle Level Cadres, the Training of the Senior Level of State Defense, and the Training of Core Coaches. The differences between the three categories are training time and target achievement of each program. For the category of Middle Level Cadre of State Defense Training and Senior Level Training of State Defense, they will experience the state defense program for five days. Meanwhile, the participants who follow the Training of Core Coaches program will experience one month training.



Based on the above explanation, as it is analyzed with the strategy theory described by Drew and Snow (1998), the Indonesian government through the Ministry of Defense uses the state defense program as a means to achieve the goal (ends) to shape the character and personality of the nation so that they are able to self-actualize to defend the country. Then, efforts to commit the awareness of state defense can be done by using any means such as Civic Education and State Defense Program.

Conclusion

Understanding of the concept of defending the state among youth must be straightened out because there are still people who think that the state defense can only be done by the military or the Army alone. In fact, based on the 1945 Constitution article 27 and 30, every citizen is obliged to defend the country according to their respective fields and professions. There are five elements in the defense of the state that can be implemented in everyday life, namely the love of the homeland, the awareness of the nation and state, believe in Pancasila as the state ideology, willing to sacrifice, and have the ability to defend the state first.

To improve the awareness of state defense among the youth, the strategy of implementing the state defense that has been done by the government of Indonesia, are through civic education and the State Defense Program. Lessons about civic education are being provided from elementary school to higher education. While the State Defense Program is a education and training program by providing material in the field of theory and practice that can be followed by all Indonesian citizens. Through the implementation strategy of state defense, can foster

a sense of nationalism and ideology Pancasila among the youth. It aims to improve the resilience of Indonesian ideology as part of national resilience.

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THE SYNERGY OF TNI, POLICE AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (BIN)

By:

Ltc. Inf Drs. Sabar Simatupang, M.Si

*(Academician of the Indonesian Defense University
and Alumni of Master of Defense Management KSKN UI.)*



Sumber : tni.mil.id

At the opening of Executive Meeting (Rapim) TNI-Polri on January 23, 2018, President Joko Widodo stressed that all TNI and Polri leadership from upper to the lower level should still be in harmony in the implementation of their duties, so that they can work together in performing their duties. The emphasis on the cohesiveness of the TNI and the Police was conveyed more to the security activities of 2018 Local Leader Election (Pilkada) and the 2019 Presidential Election. In addition, this presidential directive seems to be repeated at the same occasion during the briefing of Regional Police Leaders (Kasatwil) on October 9, 2017.

The synergy instruction between these two strategic government institutions has also been conveyed by the Chief of Police, Police General M. Tito Karnavian on the 72nd Brimob anniversary in Ambon on 14 November 2017. He said that all leaders and members of Brimob Police must continue to synergize and coordinate with the TNI. The same thing was also made by TNI Commander in Chief, General Gatot Nurmantyo at the 15th Meeting of Rakerpus and National Conference of Pepabri on 22 November 2017, stressed that TNI and Polri Solidity is a pillar of the solidarity of NKRI.

The momentum of the change of the TNI Commander in Chief in early December 2017 can certainly also be used as a challenge for the new TNI Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto to continue the solidity. The following reviews attempt to describe critically the conditions of national security development within the three-year period of the Jokowi-JK Administration. How far is the policy of Security Sector Reform has been achieved and how good is the relationship between TNI, Police and BIN will also be improved.

Security Sector Reform

Security Sector Reform (RSK) is



Sumber : tni-au.mil.id

Security Sector Reform (RSK) is one of the demands raised since the early days of the Reform Era in 1998. As the realization of civil society demands, the commitment of SSR is being implemented by the government gradually and continues to the present day. The SSR includes the arrangement of all sectors implementing the security function (actors, roles and responsibilities) jointly managing and operating the national security system, in line with democratic principles and good governance (Rizal Sukma, et al., 2005).

Faced with the increasingly complex development of recent threats, the presence of the state to follow up the structuring of the national security system is increasingly urgent. This complex national threat assessment clearly implies how the security arrangements are managed and organized by the government. The implementation of comprehensive national security should be regulated through a national security system.

Implementation starts from the process of determining the estimated form and type of security threats to be faced. Only then it will be determined the elements of the national security organizer deployed to face and overcome them. After that, the government will take the action plan. This action is directed, integrated and synergized, so that there is a clear command and control, according to the form and escalation of the threat.

In fact, to date, governments, parliaments and civil society groups have not succeeded in uniting their perceptions and commitments in realizing the arrangement of the national security system. Whereas in the midst of the development of increasingly intensive threats appear and increasingly complex patterns (asymmetric, proxy and hybrid), the government is expected to respond immediately and take appropriate action in overcoming it. One threat has not been tackled then another threat

comes. In this case, there is a concern that the government would not be capable, sluggish and unified to take immediate necessary action.

Threat and Management

Some prominent forms of threat during the nearly three years of Jokowi-JK's rule can be mapped from regional to national, and even international. These can be mentioned, among other things, social conflicts (in some areas and in Jakarta), forest and land fires on the islands of Sumatra and Kalimantan, terror groups at Plaza Sarinah Jl.Thamrin Jakarta, in Poso, Solo, Medan, Tangerang, Samarinda, Bandung and at Terminal Kp Melayu Jakarta.

In addition, drug crime (napza) and corruption are increasingly involving the younger generation and political elite/officials. Moreover, many other incidents such as illegal logging, mining and fishing, incidents of Indonesian



Source: sebarri.com

ZEE border violations by foreign fishing vessels, violations of the Indonesian airspace by foreign aircraft, fraudulent cases of vaccines and counterfeit drugs, abduction and hostage cases of Ship Crew by Abu Sayyaf terror groups that have happened many times, and so on.

There are various operational activities conducted by the government partially and temporarily to overcome all the incoming threats. In fact, each agency and the relevant ministries react according to their roles and responsibility, without any firmness of command and strategic control. From this experience, it is clear how the government actually needs a legal standing, a national institution and a grand strategy for a national-level security system on which to behave and act.

Other examples such as in the handling of acts of terrorism, TNI involvement with police needs further

regulation between the two main security actors, which is still not synchronized in the discussion of the revision of the Act on Terrorism Crime in the House of Representatives until today. Thus it can be understood that in doing the job, the government has not fully optimally to mobilize the entire national potential in synergy to overcome any threat that emerged so far. Including in facing the increasingly complex threat of terrorism forms, media and targets of its spread.

Similarly, cases of vaccine and counterfeit drug outbreak some time ago and the last case of PCC drug abuse, the handling was done by the Police and Ministry of Health in reaction after the public unrest. Though this case is feared very vulnerable to be infiltrated by foreign interests to threaten public health conditions, especially among adolescents, infants and children as "successor" generation of the nation in the future. Then the question is, will the government only care about

the problems after such cases develop massive and take many casualties?

In facing of the threat of terrorism and drug abuse, psychotropic and addictive substances (Napza), which are increasingly occurring today, it indicates the need for simultaneous intensive treatment involving all security actors and related ministry agencies. The fact is that the acts of terrorism occurred could have used an increasingly sophisticated form of weapon according to military standards. Similarly, actors of international organized crime are using firearms in the drug or smuggling syndicate cases.

The Needs of Re-management

Given this reality, the government and parliament are in the time of need for perception, attention and commitment at the urgent level for a legal standing of the national security system settings such as the National Security Act. This regulation can



Source: actual.com

be positioned as a "parent or legal umbrella" against all legislation that has set up several central and local government institutions (especially TNI and Police) and the community in overcoming all forms of national threat (M.AS.Hikam, 2016).

With this regulation, the Central and Regional Governments as well as the local community groups can play their roles together, how their arrangements for work and organizing are synchronized, integrated and optimal. Thus the institutional relationship between the actors implementing the Defense and Security functions (especially TNI, Police and BIN) needs to be addressed. The constitutional jurisdiction, functions and duties of each of these institutions are clearly regulated in accordance with their respective legislation, especially in the period after the reform era of 1998.

Ironically, the arrangement of cooperation and organization need to be synchronized, integrated and

maximized. There are still many overlapping loopholes or uncoordinated activities during this time between these three institutions. If they are not synchronized properly, it will lead to frictions of unfavorable relationships and tend to be egocentric.

The existence of these conditions of inequality makes the external oversight of the DPR and the NGO / academic community within the framework of "democratic political control" (Andrew Cottey, et al, 2002) also runs inconsistently and optimally against these three institutions. On the one hand, the legal standing of each institution still refers to its own regulations, while a legal standing, national institution and grand strategy in the implementation of national security as a whole has not been realized to synergize this discrepancy.

Thus, a National Security Act (Kamnas) is very urgent for the need to organize institutional relationships between the implementing actors of

security and defense functions in the future. Later this legislation is expected to synergize all existing rules in an integrated and directed. The National Security System as a grand strategy at the national level organizes the law. ***

STRENGTHENING NATIONAL HEALTH SYNERGIES THROUGH THE ENHANCEMENT OF KEMHAN AND TNI HEALTH RESOURCES PROFESSIONALISM TO SUPPORT NATIONAL DEFENSE

By:

Colonel drg. Buyung Nazeli, MARS

(The Head of sub-directorate of Health Potential Health Directorate, Directorate-General of Defence Strength MoD)



Everyone thinks that health problems are very important things that must always be considered. Because of some of the impacts that can be generated from health problems as the reason, then one is responsible to maintain his own health. How if health problems are in a national scale. Whose responsibility is that? Is it only the responsibility of individuals, groups or governments?

Nowadays, national health issues are not only a matter of

government in the field of health. In reality, the handling of health issues should involve all relevant stakeholders. Why should this be so, since the emergence of new types of disease as an outbreak of disease has become a global concern and will potentially pose a threat in the field of state defense. In the end, the involvement of MoD and TNI became strategic. Therefore, cooperation and synergy between government agencies involved in the handling is needed.

Intensive discussion on health issues from individual health to national health issues, have discussed in Health Coordination Meeting (Rakorkes) Forum held by Health Directorate, Directorate General of Defence Strength MoD on Monday (12/2), at MoD Office Jakarta.

The theme raised in Health Coordination Meeting Health Directorate, Directorate General of Defence Strength Year 2018 is "Strengthening National

Health Synergies through the Enhancement of Kemhan and TNI Professional Health Resources to Support National Defense". This theme is considered very relevant with efforts to overcome health problems in Kemhan and TNI at this time.

Increased Synergy for Finding Solutions of the Problems

Health Coordination Meeting Forum DG of Directorate General of Defence Strength in the Year 2018 served as a means to improve synergy, togetherness and commitment in the implementation of Directorate General of Defence Strength MoD duties along with Health TNI, Institutions as well as related Ministries / Institutions Health. The synergy and togetherness will be useful to find solutions of health problems on a national scale to support the task of Kemhan and TNI.

There were more than 150 participants of MoD/TNI health officials as well as representatives

of health officials from related Ministry / Institution come to discuss current health issues. The latest health issues discussed in the Health Coordination Meeting Forum are Geomedical data and information, threats of infectious disease outbreaks, improvement of health personnel skills, health services, financial governance of hospital BLU and the flow of health equipment procurement procedures.

Regarding the discussion on Geomedic data and information, the Health Coordination Meeting forum was presented by Chief of Data and Information MoD, Air First Marshal TNI Yusuf Jauhari. On that occasion Chief of Data and Information explained about the ease of process in charging Geomedik data through Geomedik application data which can be done by health staff starting from the lowest health unit to the top unit.

The importance of Geomedik strategic is the ability in data processing to be strategic

information that can be used by the leader in making the right decision and can be accountable in order to support the State defense. In the process of developing Geomedic information systems for defense purposes, cooperation and commitment of all health elements within MoD and TNI are urgently needed.

The latest issues about the threat of infectious disease outbreak, Director General of Disease Prevention and Control (Ditjen P2PI) Ministry of Health, (Kemenkes), dr. Subuh said that the infectious disease outbreak is an emergency incident in the field of public health is increasing, and has become a national and global attention.

The possibility of occasional outbreaks of infectious diseases can be a threat to the field of state defense. According to the Director General of P2P this condition is caused by several factors, among which the population continues to grow, the dynamic



interaction between human and animal carriers, climate change, advances in transportation so as to facilitate the movement of people. It is combined with the change of habitat and environmental factors Vector and rodents due to housing and industrial development, social conflicts in some countries, and advances in information technology through various media.

International communities have paid special attention to the threat of infectious disease outbreaks. The world's organizations have formed the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) as a supervision forum. The GHSA is a continuation of the WHO International Health Regulation (IHR), which can be used as a platform for inter-state cooperation to be engaged in disease control.

The interesting thing about the threat of infectious disease outbreaks is not only health problems, but it has become a security problem of a country. So the involvement of the Ministry of

Defense and the TNI will have a strategic meaning in the context of National defense.

Meanwhile, related to the problem of increasing the ability of health personnel, The Head of sub-directorate of Health Potential Health Directorate, Directorate-General of Defence Strength MoD, Colonel drg. Buyung Nazeli, MARS said about efforts to fulfill health facilities. The fulfillment of this health facility can be done through the improvement of the quality of health service and the fulfillment of medics in the operation unit in order to support the operational activity or the health exercise activity.

In the implementation of the improvement of service quality and the fulfillment of these medics, cooperation between DG of Defense Strength MoD as well as the Health Human Resources Development and Emstrengthenment (PPSDM) Ministry of Health is required. This cooperation is directed to the compulsory assignment of medical specialist

in health care facilities within the TNI, especially for those who are assigned in remote and border areas.

Health services within MoD and TNI are basically a part of the National Health Insurance System that refers to regulations compiled by the Government. However, health services in MoD and TNI have their own uniqueness that has not been accommodated in the regulation issued by the Ministry of Health.

On the other hand, the health service sector is basically also concerned with the aspect of the service itself and the BLU financial management to support the efforts to improve the quality of the health services performance of the main hospitals.

Furthermore, related to other current health issues of financial governance of Public Service Agency (BLU). By applying BLU in this financial management, hospitals within MoD and TNI,



will have advantages. One of the advantages in the form of financial management, it can be more flexible, so it is expected to improve the performance in health services to TNI soldiers, civil servants in the MoD and the family.

Director General of Defense Strength Ministry of Defense Maj. Gen. Bambang Hartawan, MSc, at MoD Health Coordination Meeting 2018 forum stated that health in MoD and TNI is an integral part of the state defense system. Therefore, participation and cooperation with all elements of national health is required.

Director General of Defense Strength mentioned, one example of cooperation is to create a national health insurance program to improve the welfare of soldiers, civil servants and their families. This health insurance program is expected to be able to make a better quality of health services in MoD and TNI.

According to the Director General of Defence Strength, health

insurance program is needed to synchronize the policy made by the Ministry of Health with guidance on the Social Security Administering Agency (BPJS) Health. Health insurance program is also expected to accommodate the uniqueness of health services carried by MoD all this time. In connection with that, Director General of Defence Strength has requested to the Ministry of Health in order that the national health care health service for TNI soldiers, civil servants of MoD and their families can be incorporated into the regulation.

On the other hand, Director General of Defence Strength has requested the health personnel in the field of education and development within MoD and TNI, to continuously improve the quality of their skills on the respective fields. The quality improvement will be very useful to support the process of providing a good quality of health services to soldiers, civil servants and their families.

However, to actualize the good services, these conditions would require cooperation and integrated

coordination. Besides, it is also need a comprehensive policy that refers to national policy and be able to synergize with all elements of the national health.

In front of the participants, Director General of Defence Strength mention that the improvement in coordination, communication and cooperation with related parties in the health sector should be done intensively in order to strengthen the coordination and synergy in finding solutions to solve health problems in MoD and TNI. On the aspects of communication networks with BPJS and the Ministry of Health, the intensive communication should be done continuously.

Furthermore, Director General of Defence Strength also believes that the management of Geomedical data and information that is used as information in the field of medical intelligence can be developed and improved. It is used to strengthen the state defense health system in support of national defense. ***



COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION FOR THE EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF FLAG OFFICER AND COLONEL

By:

Brigadier General TNI Sisriadi

Secretary Directorate-General of Defence Strenght MoD

Introduction

There was an interesting discussion going on in a group of Colonels, at one of the event AH Nasution Building, Medan Merdeka Barat Street. One of them delivered one joke that attracted the author to pay more attention. According to the officer, Colonel and Flag Officer's career is like playing "ular tangga" game, if anyone is unlucky, he will end up at "lantai delapan". The officer's point is relevant to the problem of excessive number of Flag Officer

and Colonel in the entire Armed Forces and Services organization.

In fact, the excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel is not a new problem. The "seeds" of the problem has been planted in the last 13 years, since the ratification of Act number 34 year 2004 stipulating the Indonesia Armed Forces. It is unclear, whether Armed Forces' leaders consider the excessive number of Flag Officers and Colonel as a problem or not. Within the Indonesia Army, this problem actually has already

been detected early. In the Armed Forces personnel community annual meeting, year 2007, Assistant Personnel Chief of Staff of the Indonesia Army forecasted an awaiting problem of excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel, which would start in year 2009. The Assistant Personnel Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army also mentioned that the excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel would likely occur within the Navy and Air Forces organization, since the problem had the same root.

According to Assistant Personnel Chief of the the Armed Forces, the excessive number of Flag Officer in the entire the Armed Forces

organization has reached a number of 141 persons (22.2% TDA), which includes 63 persons of Army Flag Officer, 45 persons of Naval Flag Officer and 37 persons of Air Force Flag Officer. While the excessive number of Colonel has reached 790 persons (22.6% TDA), which include 469 persons of Army Colonel, 214 persons of Naval Colonel and 140 persons of Air Force Colonel.

These problems have built negative influence against individual officer. On the other hand, its also affects the entire Armed Forces organization. Therefore, some comprehensive measures should be taken to prevent collateral impact against the Armed Forces capability. In order to preserve optimum capability of the Armed Forces to perform it task in a complex environment.

The author intents to discuss about the excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel within the Armed Forces organization, analysis of the causes of the problem and to recommend problem's solution.

This paper is to provide input to the Armed Forces and Services' leaders as well as the policy makers in the Ministry of Defense to avail themselves in seeking a comprehensive solution for the excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel within the Armed Forces organization.


Problem Of The Armed Forces' Manpower Management


The excessive 141 Flag Officer and 790 Colonel in the Armed Forces organization by the end of year 2017 did not occur in a short time. The problem occurs in a relatively long period, which in fact is an accumulation of unsolved manpower management problems in the past. For example, in the Army organization, the excessive number of Flag Officer and the Colonel had started since 2011, as figured on the following chart.

In 2011, the Flag Officer number exceeded TDA by 7 persons, in 2012 the number increased to 9 persons. It then

reached 20 persons in 2013, 32 persons in 2014, 31 persons in 2015, 46 persons in 2016, and it reached 63 persons by the end of 2017. The chart shows the increase of excessive number of Flag Officer from 2011 to 2017. The charts indicated that the Army HQ tried to narrow the gap between the TDA and the existing number of Flag Officer in 2012 and 2017.

The excessive number of personnel also occurred in group of Colonel as indicated in the following chart. In 2011 the excessive number of Colonel reached 83 persons, in 2012 reached 230 persons, in 2013 reached 253 persons, in 2014 reached 286 persons, in 2015 reached 422 persons, in 2016 reached 562 persons and by the end of 2017, the number reached 468 persons. The Army Headquarters tried to narrow the gap between the authorized and real number of Colonel in the TDA, by creating additional





jobs in TDA, as shown in 2012, 2015 and 2017.

The question is, do the measures lead to solves the excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel problem? It turns out that the measures were fail. The number of Flag Officer and Colonel kept growing more rapidly after the TDA was changed. This is because problem-solving efforts made by Army was not aimed on the issue, but on the impact thereof. The measures were like a doctor who treated the patients in order to relieve the symptoms, but not the cause of the disease.

The Affecting Factors of The Growth of Flag Officer and Colonel


By analyzing the growth of Flag Officer and Colonel on the charts above, the conclusion is that the the main reason of

excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel is due to the growth of the number of Flag Officer and Colonel is too fast, instead of the insufficient TDA. It is evident that the enlargement of TDA in 2012, 2015 did not halt the excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel in the respective following years.

Within Armed Forces personnel community, there are still someone who argue that the abolition of “Dwi Fungsi ABRI”, stipulated in Act number 34 year 2004, is a major factor that prompted the increase of number of Flag Officer and Colonels. They argued that after the abolition of “Dwi Fungsi ABRI”, there were influx of Colonel into the Armed Forces structure. Up to the year 2012, that opinion was still valid. However, they all left the Armed Forces in 2012. Then, the abolition of “Dwi Fungsi ABRI” has not affected

on Armed Forces organization any longer.

There are at least three factors considered to be the cause of the excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel within the Armed Forces. First, the extension of retirement age of the Armed Forces officer stipulated in article 71 of the Act number 34 year 2004. According to the article, maximum retirement age for officer is extended from 55 years to 58 years. It means that there are additional 3 years service for every individual. A few years after the Act took into effect, there were an imbalance of officer’s personnel composition within the Armed Forces structures, which exist until now. On the one hand, number of Flag Officer and Colonel are excessive, but on the other hand there are shortage of Lieutenant Colonel downward (shown in Figure-1). There is a direct link between



the extension of the retirement age with the excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel. The extension of the retirement age for three years has led to prolong the employment of Flag Officer and Colonel that inhibit the vertical movement of Lieutenant Colonel and lower.

The second is that there is a disharmony between the leadership development policy through mid-level education and mid-level leader career development. For example, in the Army organization, the Army Headquarters decided that only selected officer may become Colonel and Flag Officer. Theoretically, the selection process was done through the O-6 council. Practically, the selection is conducted earlier, i.e. Army General Staff Course entry test. This is indicated by the fact that all Command and General Staff Course graduates

are eligible for O-6 jobs. This policy also applies in the Navy and the Air Force. If the allocation of Army Command and General Staff Course is not carefully calculated, then it results in a surplus of Colonel.


The third is that the Armed forces career management system literally retains individual soldier to serve the Armed Forces for good, until he/she reaches retirement age. This approach is stipulated in Government Regulation number 39 year 2010 concerning the Armed Forces Soldier Administrative Rule. Article 21 (3) states that, "the Regular soldier who completes the initial compulsory service and does not admit retirement proposal for specific reason is considered continuing his/her service". This rule constrains the maintenance of personnel composition balance between input and output of personnel.

This rule also will hardly let the Armed Forces Headquarters to end individual soldier's service for the shake of the Armed Forces.

Comprehending the problem of excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel using the Pyramid of Personnel

The Pyramid of Personnel is one of personnel management's tool that can be used to control the quantity of personnel of services (Army, Navy and Air Force). Using the pyramid personnel, every one will easily know some personnel management's issues, such as recruitment, classification, education, separation of personnel and so on.

With regard to the excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel, the pyramid of personnel provides a logical



description of the causes of excessive number of those groups. In Figure-1 above, six black rectangles on the left depict the amount of available job to accommodate personnel with regards to authorized TDA. On the figure, all officers are

divided into six groups, namely Lieutenant, Captain, Major, Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel and Flag Officer. The longer the rectangle, the larger the job available to accommodate the officer of the respective group.

The size of job space is one of parameters to define standard serving period for individual officer in certain rank. The larger the job spaces the longer individual officer serves in that rank. Larger job space also allows more flexibility for personnel

Tabel-1: Perhitungan MDDP berdasarkan rasio DSPP

GOLONGAN	DSPP	MDDP IDEAL	MDDP SEBELUM 2004	MDDP 2004 - SAAT INI
1	2	3	4	5
PATI	107	0,1	8	11
KOL	979	0,9	4	4
LETKOL	3.711	3,3	4	4
MAYOR	6.820	6	5	5
KAPTEN	15.526	13,7	4	4
LETNAN	12.595	11	7	7

*MDDP MIN: Masa Dinas Perwira yang digunakan sebagai persyaratan UKP, yang merupakan penjumlahan akumulatif dari MDDP kepangkatan di bawahnya

tour of duty within the group. For practical reason, the TDA data is arranged (piled) vertically as shown in the figure-2. The numbers on the left side (black) shows the available job space on each group of ranks, while on the right side shows the ideal serving period for individual officer in certain rank. Ideal serving period in certain rank is the result of TDA divided by optimum serving period for officer according to Act Number 34 Year 2004, i.e. 35 years.

On the picture above, ideal serving period for individual officer for Lieutenant (2nd and 1st Lieutenant) is 10.2 years; Captain 11.7 years; Major 7.4 years, Lt. Colonel 3.9 years, Colonel 1.5 years, and Flag Officer 0.3 years. Those figures can not literally be applied, otherwise it will create more complicated problem. Therefore, the adjustment is required in accordance with the specificity of each job description in terms

of the nature of work; job's risk and so on.

Prior to the ratification of Act Number 34 Year 2004, the serving period in the rank of Lieutenant was 7 years, Captain was 4 years, Major was 5 years, Lieutenant Colonel was 4 years, Colonel was 4 years and Flag Officer was 8 years. By then, no excessive number of Flag Officer and the Colonel was found due to the adjustment of the number of officers to the serving period in the rank and job space. Since the Act Number 34 Years 2004 was ratified, the Armed Forces Headquarters had never made any change to officer's serving period criteria in promotion regulation, so that the serving period in the Flag Officer was extended from 8 years to 11 years, however, there was no change occurred in the lower ranks. This is the factor that cause the excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel problem. Table-1 describes the

the serving period in the rank before and after the Act Number 34 Year 2004 ratification.

Solving The Problem Of The Excessive Number Of Flag Officers And Colonel

Changes of Officer's Serving Period

As described previously, the problem of excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel had been predicted since year 2007, but there have never been systemic solutions to end the problem. The real issue is clear, namely the throttling of longitudinal movement of personnel in the group of Flag Officer due to three-year extension of official serving period of Flag Officer, while the number of job space is relatively fixed. Adding the job space within the TDA is not the right solution, this step has created new problems instead. The only way is to reconstitute the In Rank Serving

Tabel-2: Saran Perubahan MDDP dan MDP untuk UKP Perwira

GOLONGAN	MDDP			MDP MIN UNTUK UKP		
	SAAT INI	SARAN	PERUBAHAN	SAAT INI	SARAN	PERUBAHAN
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
PATI	11	8	-3	24	27	+3
IV / KOL	4	4	Tetap	20	23	+3
V / LETKOL	4	4	Tetap	16	19	+3
VI / MAYOR	5	5,5	+0,5	11	13,5	+2,5
VII / KAPTEN	4	5,5	+1,5	7	8	+1
VIII / LETNAN	7	8	+1			

Period, through redistribution of additional retirement age (3 years) to the other rank proportionally in accordance with the characteristics of each job description as seen at the column 4. The the In Rank Serving Period changes will by default change the minimum officer's serving period, used for the promotion consideration as indicated in column 7.

The changes of the OSP as shown in column 6 are expectedly able to maintain the balance of the personnel composition in terms in terms of class graduation year. Job space of Flag Officer will be filled by 8 class of Military Academy and Career Officer School graduates. They are Flag Officers with 27 up to 35 years service (the maximum age). Job spaces of Colonel will be filled by 12 classes of Military Academy and Career Officer School graduates, started from Colonel with 23 up to 35 years service (the maximum age). Job space of Lieutenant Colonel will be filled by 16 classes of Military Academy and Career Officer School graduates, started Lieutenant Colonel with 19 up to 35 years service (age maximum). Job space of Lieutenant Colonel will also be filled by 5 classes of Regular Officer school graduates with 19 up to 24 years service (maximum age), assuming that they enter the school after 14 years service.

Job space of Major will be filled by 7 class of Military Academy and Career Officer School graduates, ranging from Major with 14 up to 21 years

service; as well as 10 class of Regular Officer School graduates with 14 up to 24 years service (maximum age). Job space of Captain will be filled by 7 class of Military Academy and Career Officer School graduates with 8 to 15 years service; as well as 12 class of Regular Officer School graduates with 8 to 20 years service (maximum age). Job space of Lieutenant will be filled by 9 class of Military Academy, Career Officer School and Regular Officer School graduates up to 9 years service.

It is understood that the change of In Rank Serving Period and minimum officer's serving period in the officer's promotion requirement not only solves the problem of excessive number of Flag Officer, but also could provide a solution to the problems of man power management in general. Without changing the the In Rank Serving Period and officer's serving period, the excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel will continue to happen and become a permanent problem.

Flag Officer and Colonel cadre recruitment

Flag Officer and Colonel cadre recruitment is a preparation of selected personnel through mid-level leadership education in services' Command and General Staff Course. Therefore, the amount of the course's student must meet the need to fill job spaces of Lieutenant Colonel and above. For example, the Army Command and General Staff Course is ideally only

opened for 150 persons annually. The calculation is based on the job space of Flag Officer and Colonel within and outside the structure of the Army (1,800 persons) divided by the Colonel and Flag Officer serving period (12 years), added by 10% deviation, practically the school is authorized for 165 persons annually. If the school is opened for more officers, then it will create to many eligible Lieutenant Colonel to fill Colonel jobs. If all of the eligible Lieutenant Colonel was promoted to Colonel, there would automatically be excessive number of Colonel.

Opening New Exit Points

To manage the balance of personnel quantity, officially there are three exit points for Military Academy and Career Officer School graduate, i.e. on the Flag Officer, Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel. There are also three exit points for Regular Officer School graduates, i.e. on the V (Lieutenant Colonel), VI (major) and VII (Captain). To increase the effectiveness of the man power management and to maintain healthy composition of the personnel, new separation points must be opened, i.e. a mechanism of separating personnel before they reach maximum age for the shake of organization interest.

The policy maker in Ministry of Defense is responsible to authorize new separation point by revising Government Regulation Number 39 Year 2010, section 21 verse (2) which

mentions “regular soldier who will end his/her initial compulsory service must apply resignation in writing to the competent authority in hierarchically at least 6 (six) months before the end of his/her initial compulsory service end”. Furtherly, verse (3) stipulates, “Regular Soldier complete his/her initial compulsory service and does not apply resignation for some reason, considered as continuing advanced compulsory”. Both verses note that every soldier basically bond themselves to serve the armed forces until the maximum age limit, unless they resign at the end of the initial compulsory service. With regard to the excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel, those verses become counter productive because it constrains the retirement of soldiers before maximum of age.

To prevent the excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel, those verse must be revised that every officer is obliged to apply for extension of compulsory service when his/her initial compulsory service end. If he/she does not apply for an extension, then he/she is considered as retiring his/her service. Therefore, a mechanism to select officers who have applied for an extension of the compulsory service should be created. With this kind of mechanism, then the balance of personnel composition may continue to be observed. This mechanism also gives the opportunity to individual officer to opt his/her second career outside military life. Those who

do not extend the compulsory service and take their civilian life should not be considered as one who avoid the obligation to the defense nation, since constitutionally they are still bonded as reserve components. According to our national defense system, they are well trained patriot who by law can be mobilized should the nation in need.

Recommendations

Since the ratification of Act Number 34 Year 2004, the excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel continues to evolve until now. The leadership within the Armed Forces has changed several times, but the problem has been no sign for an end. Technically, the problem is not too difficult to solve. The problem can be solved using the personnel composition management approach.

There are at least three different approaches to be taken simultaneously by different authority level. First, the Ministry of Defense is to review and make any necessary changes to the Government Regulations with regards to soldier’s administrative regulation, especially the one which related to early retirement system. Second, the Armed Forces headquarters is to revise officer career management, especially the rules associated with the Officer Serving Period regulation. Third, the services headquarters are to recalculate the allocation of services Command and General Staff Course student, in order to

manage proportional Colonel and Flag Officer cadre.

The key to solve the excessive Flag Officer and Colonel problem is to change the regulation concerning Officer Serving Period. However, it must be understood that solving the problem of excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel will take time, since the problem did not arise instantly. The excessive number of Flag Officer and Colonel had grown gradually for several years. If the Armed Forces Regulation concerning Officer Serving Period is taken into effect in 2018, then the the problem is expected to be totally solved by 2021.

In addition to those three steps, the respective service Headquarters are to take further steps to minimized the risk due to the changes of Officer Serving Period regulation. First, each Headquarters Force need to streamline it’s TDA from the unnecessary jobs. The jobs that were intentionally designed to accommodate the excessive Flag Officer and Colonel in the past, should be reduced gradually and selectively to prevent it from burdening the organization.

Second, each Service’s needs to proportionally manage class graduate’s allocation to fill Flag Officer job spaces. Table 3 below is to illustrate how to organize the promotion of Flag Officer, using Army as sample. The table is in fact a composite matrix between class composition of Army Flag Officer (within and outside of structure) in a given

year (raw) and class graduates allocation to fill the TDA (column). The raw represent personnel composition of Flag Officer in a given year. For instance, in 2027, the amount of job space in the structure of the Army are 115 persons, while the job space in Armed Forces Headquarters and outside structure of the Armed Forces are 158, calculated based Flag Officer's ratio in the Army, Navy and the Air Forces TDA. Thus, the total allocation of the Army Flag Officer are 273 persons. With the In Rank Serving Period of 8 years on the Flag Officer, then in year 2027 there will be 8 layers of class graduates that fill the job space of Flag Officer inside and outside the structure of the Army, with composition as shown in line 1, as follows:

- ☐ Class of 1993 graduates : 10 persons
- ☐ Class of 1994 graduates : 25 persons
- ☐ Class of 1995 graduates : 60 persons
- ☐ Class of 1996 graduates : 65 persons
- ☐ Class of 1997 graduates : 50 persons
- ☐ Class of 1998 graduates : 35 persons
- ☐ Class of 1999 graduates : 20 persons
- ☐ Class of 2000 graduates : 8 persons

To describe how the class graduate's promotion works, the author used class of 2000 as a model. 2027 year is the first year for class 2000 to fill the post of Flag Officer with 8 persons. In the second year (2028), the allocation of class 2000 is 20 persons, so 12 Colonel of class 2000 are to be promoted to Brigadier General. In the third year (2029), 15 Colonels of class 2000 must be promoted to Brigadier General in order to reach 35 persons allocated, and so on, until the eighth year (2034), as shown in column 9..***

Tabel-3: Alokasi *lichting* untuk penempatan dalam jabatan Pati dalam struktur dan luar satruktur TNI AD

KOMPOSISI PATI PER TAHUN	ALOKASI PATI PER LICHTING															PROMOSI PATI LICHTING 2000
	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
2027	10	25	60	65	50	35	20	8								8
2028		10	25	60	65	50	35	20	8							≥ 12
2029			10	25	60	65	50	35	20	8						≥ 15
2030				10	25	60	65	50	35	20	8					≥ 15
2031					10	25	60	65	50	35	20	8				≥ 15
2032						10	25	60	65	50	35	20	8			≥ 0
2033							10	25	60	65	50	35	20	8		≥ 0
2034								10	25	60	65	50	35	20	8	≥ 0
																≥ 65

